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ONE VOTE, TWO VOTES, THREE VOTES, FOUR: HOW
RANKED CHOICE VOTING BURDENS VOTING RIGHTS AND
MORE
Brandon Bryer*

I. INTRODUCTION

Without the sound and secure ability to vote, all other rights and
liberties are defenseless.1 The majority of Americans exercise that
precious ballot box right by means of a plurality, winner-take-all
election.2 Also termed “first-past-the-post” elections, plurality systems
require voters to cast a single vote for a single candidate.3 The
candidate who simply receives the most votes is declared the winner.4
Although this system is familiar to the American electorate, a more
unfamiliar system of voting is gaining popularity across the country.5
This system is known as ranked choice voting (“RCV”) and it is
already a reality for millions of voters.6 In states such as Maine and
Alaska and cities such as Minneapolis and San Francisco, millions of
Americans exercise the right to vote differently than the rest of the
nation.7 And the change is spreading.8
At its core, RCV permits a voter to select multiple candidates in
order of preference.9 Instead of selecting only one candidate, as is done
under a plurality system, RCV allows voters to express support for

* Editor-in-Chief, University of Cincinnati Law Review. A special thank you is owed to Michael Solimine,
Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, for his helpful
suggestions, valuable expertise in election law, and constant guidance on this topic. The author would
also like to thank his fellow UCLR editorial team whose careful edits made this Article much improved.
1. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if
the right to vote is undermined.”).
2. Electoral Systems in the United States, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/research_
electoralsystemsus, (last visited April 27, 2021).
3. Charles King, Electoral Systems, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, https://faculty.georgetown
.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm, (last visited April 27, 2021).
4. Id.
5. Laura Tamman, Ranked Choice Voting is Coming. Here’s What Campaigns Need to Know,
CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaigninsider/ranked-choice-voting-is-coming-here-s-what-campaigns-need-to-know.
6. Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Ranked-choice_voting_
(RCV), (last visited April 27, 2021).
7. Id.
8. Amanda Zoch, The Rise of Ranked-Choice Voting, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/the-rise-ofranked-choice-voting.aspx.
9. Details about RCV, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#how_rcv_works, (last visited
April 27, 2021).
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their first-choice candidate, second-choice, third-choice, and so on.10
After the first round of tabulation, if any one candidate receives fifty
percent or more of the first-choice votes, that candidate wins the
election outright.11 But if no candidate secures more than fifty percent
of the vote, RCV elections proceed to subsequent rounds of vote
counting.12 First, the bottom candidates who cannot mathematically
reach fifty percent are eliminated.13 Then, the votes for these noweliminated candidates are reallocated to the voter’s second-choice
candidate.14 If a voter’s first-choice candidate was not eliminated, that
first-choice vote remains the same and is simply carried over into the
next round.15 This vote reallocation process continues until one
candidate receives over fifty percent of the vote and is thus declared
the winner.16
When voting laws are altered, lawsuits often follow.17 RCV is no
exception. RCV has been challenged in federal and state courts on both
federal and state constitutional grounds.18 The most common legal
challenge instituted against RCV is under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which dictates that “no State shall […]
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”19 When RCV is contested for violating the equal protection
guarantee, however, courts have uniformly upheld it as
constitutional.20
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Some RCV elections use a process called “batch elimination” where all candidates who are
mathematically unable to win are removed in one blanket elimination. See, e.g., ME St T. 21-A section
723-A. Other RCV systems only eliminate one candidate at a time. This single elimination process
proceeds candidate by candidate until one candidate receives fifty percent support. See, e.g., San Francisco
City Charter, § 13.102.
14. See, e.g., ME St T. 21-A section 723-A. Note, too, that as this process continues, if a voter’s
second-choice candidate was also eliminated, the RCV tabulation moves on to the voter’s third-choice
candidate, fourth-choice, and so on.
15. Id.
16. BALLOTPEDIA supra note 6.
17. See Voting Rights Litigation, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, (March 2, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-2020.
18. On federal grounds, RCV has been challenged under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Elections Clause, and the Voting Rights
Act. See, e.g., Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011); Baber v. Dunlap, 376 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.
Maine 2018). On state grounds, See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 162 A.3d 188, 211 (Me. 2017). For a
more in-depth discussion of state constitutional challenges to RCV, See Pildes, Richard H. and Parsons,
G. Michael, The Legality of Ranked-Choice Voting, CALIFORNIA L. REV., Forthcoming. This Comment
focuses exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause issue.
19. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. See, e.g., Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1112; Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766
N.W.2d 683, 689-98 (Minn. 2009).
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This Comment argues that although unanimous, the decisions
upholding RCV under the Federal Constitution are incorrect. These
opinions are cursory and rest on incorrect premises about how RCV
elections operate in practice and the true burdens that RCV systems
impose on voting rights. First, Part I describes the logistics of RCV,
the legal standard for evaluating election laws, and specific legal
challenges to RCV. Part II details how RCV burdens voting rights and
how courts have relied on incorrect grounds to uphold RCV systems.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that going forward, once the faulty
premises are corrected and the proper legal standard is applied, courts
should hold that RCV violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND

Although RCV is unfamiliar to most Americans, it can have great
impacts on the way in which they exercise the right to vote. Because it
is imperative to better understand this obscure, yet rapidly expanding
electoral system, this Part explores RCV’s history, growth, and
influence. First, Section A describes the facts of RCV—its historical
development, the logistics of an RCV election, and the arguments for
and against its use. Then, Section B shifts focus from facts to law and
discusses the famous Anderson-Burdick framework used to evaluate
the constitutionality of state election laws. Finally, Section C surveys
the judicial opinions upholding RCV and the courts’ justifications for
doing so.
A. Ranked Choice Voting
1. The History and Growth of RCV

The general concept of ranked voting has existed in the United
States since the 1870s.21 That general concept materialized into RCV
in the early twentieth century, sparked by the rise of the Bull Moose
Party and the 1912 presidential election.22 In the 1912 general election,
Theodore Roosevelt ran as the Progressive Bull Moose Party candidate
after narrowly losing the Republican nomination to William Howard
Taft.23 On election day, the conservative vote splintered between
21. Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1103.W.R. Ware, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
developed the first known “instant runoff” approach to elections in the late nineteenth century. Id.
22. Jacey Fortin, Why Ranked-Choice Voting Is Having a Moment, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Feb.
10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/ranked-choice-voting.html.
23. Id.
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Roosevelt and Taft, thus propelling the Democrat, Woodrow Wilson,
to the presidency.24 While RCV was not used in the 1912 election, the
shock of a viable third party candidate thrust its underlying concept
into the national spotlight.25 Consequently, cities such as Ashtabula,
Ohio and Kalamazoo, Michigan experimented with RCV to elect their
local officials as early as 1915.26
Despite its niche historical existence, RCV has only recently gained
notoriety in the twenty-first century.27 As of 2021, fourteen states have
adopted RCV at the state or local level.28 Maine uses RCV for all
federal elections.29 In 2020, Alaskans voted to adopt RCV for both
federal and state elections.30 Similarly, although California does not
use RCV statewide, large cities such as San Francisco, Oakland, and
Berkeley use RCV for mayoral and local elections.31 On its largest
scale to date, RCV is now used by the more than eight million residents
of New York City when electing its mayor.32 In addition to the
seventeen states that already have some form of RCV, twenty-two
other states have introduced legislation to adopt RCV.33 In states where
no legislation is pending, private organizations are actively working to
implement RCV. One such group, Rank the Vote Ohio, advocates for
the use of RCV for state and federal elections across the Buckeye
State.34 Many other crucial electoral battleground states have similar
organizations.35

24. Id.
25. Id. (“[the 1912 election] helped strengthen the case for electoral reform.”).
26. The forgotten results & future promise of ranked choice voting in Ohio, FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/the_forgotten_results_future_promise_of_ranked_choice_voting_in_ohio, (last
visited April 27, 2021).
27. Adam Eichen, The Case for using Ranked Choice Voting in the 2020 Democratic Presidential
Primaries, IN THESE TIMES, (April 1, 2019), https://inthesetimes.com/article/ranked-choice-voting-2020democratic-presidential-primary-bernie-sanders.
28. BALLOTPEDIA supra note 6.
29. Maine does not use RCV for electing state officers. In an advisory opinion, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court held RCV unconstitutional under the Maine state constitution that requires state candidates
be elected by a “plurality” of votes. Opinion of the Justices, 162 A.3d at 211.
30. Kelsey Piper, Alaksa voters adopt ranked-choice voting in ballot initiative, VOX, (Nov. 19,
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/19/21537126/alaska-measure-2-ranked-choice-voting-results.
31. BALLOTPEDIA supra note 6.
32. Erin Durkin, Ranked-choice voting adopted in New York City, along with other ballot
measures,
POLITICO,
(Nov.
5,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany
/story/2019/11/05/ranked-choice-voting-adopted-in-new-york-city-along-with-other-ballot-measures1226390.
33. BALLOTPEDIA supra note 6.
34. RANK THE VOTE OHIO, https://www.rankthevoteohio.org, (last visited April 27, 2021).
35. Ranked Choice Voting in Pennsylvania, THE ACTION NETWORK, https://actionnetwork.
org/petitions/ranked-choice-voting-in-pennsylvania, (last visited April 27, 2021).
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RCV has not been welcomed everywhere, however. In 2020, fiftyfive percent of Massachusetts voters shot down a referendum to use
RCV for state and federal elections.36 Shortly after New York City
citizens voted to adopt RCV, numerous Democratic members of the
New York City Council sued to enjoin its implementation, citing voter
education concerns.37 The California legislature twice attempted to
enact RCV statewide, but Democratic Governors Jerry Brown and
Gavin Newsom vetoed the bill, in part because of the system’s
complex nature.38 The citizens of Burlington, Vermont repealed their
RCV system after a disfavored third-party mayoral candidate, who
garnered only twenty-nine percent of votes in the first round of an
election, nevertheless won after subsequent rounds of tabulation.39
An interest in enacting RCV has also spread to the federal level. In
2019, U.S. Congressman Jamie Raskin of Maryland introduced the
Ranked Choice Voting Act, which would enact RCV nationwide for
all federal elections.40 Also, in 2021, U.S. Congressman John Sarbanes
introduced the For the People Act, which would require all states
receiving federal election grants to replace voting systems with those
capable of tabulating RCV ballots.41 In the 2020 Democratic
Presidential Primary, candidates such as Elizabeth Warren and
Andrew Yang made the nationwide enactment of RCV a central policy
objective.42

36. Craig LeMoult, Why Did Massachusetts Reject Ranked-Choice Voting?, GBH NEWS, (Nov. 4,
2020), https://www.wgbh.org/news/politics/2020/11/04/why-did-massachusetts-reject-ranked-choicevoting.
37. Rebecca C. Lewis, New lawsuit could delay ranked-choice voting in NYC, CITY & STATE NEW
YORK, (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-york-city/new-lawsuitcould-delay-ranked-choice-voting-nyc.html.
38. John Wildermuth, Gavin Newsom vetoes bill to allow ranked choice voting throughout
California, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.
com/politics/article/Gavin-Newsom-vetoes-bill-to-allow-ranked-choice-14535193.php.
39. Philip Baruth, Voting Paradoxes and Perverse Outcomes, THE VERMONT DAILY BRIEFING,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110726125814/http://vermontdailybriefing.com/?p=1213, (last visited
April 27, 2021). The 2010 election in Burlington, Vermont is often cited by opponents of RCV to
demonstrate the system’s perverse results. After the first round of votes, fifty-four percent of Burlington
citizens did not want the prevailing candidate to win. Nevertheless, RCV permitted that candidate to win.
Moreover, even while using RCV, the prevailing candidate never surpassed fifty percent support. Id.
40. Ranked Choice Voting Act, H.R. 4464, 116th Cong. (2019-20). The bill was referred to the
Committee on House Administration on September 24, 2019. The bill remains pending as of September
2021. Id.
41. For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 298(e) (2021). The bill passed the House
of Representatives on March 3, 2021. The bill is pending in the Senate as of September 2021. Id.
42. Warren and Raskin Publish Op-Ed in Support of Ranked-Choice Voting, (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/icymi-warren-and-raskin-publish-op-ed-insupport-of-ranked-choice-voting.
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2. Logistics of RCV Elections

Although slight variations exist, RCV systems are relatively similar.
First, although voters rank candidates on an RCV ballot, the voting
reallocation process—that is subsequent rounds where second-choice
candidates are considered—does not kick in unless no candidate
receives fifty percent of the first round votes.43 If a candidate does
receive fifty percent, the election is over and rankings are not utilized.
Second, RCV statutes share common terminology. If further tabulation
is needed, candidates who cannot reach the fifty percent threshold after
the first round are eliminated and deemed “non-continuing
candidates;” those who do have a mathematical possibility of meeting
the fifty-percent threshold are “continuing candidates.”44 Third, RCV
statutes limit the number of candidates a voter can rank. For example,
if ten candidates qualify for ballot access, voters can only rank five,45
or sometimes as low as three,46 candidates.
For an illustration of how RCV works in practice, consider Maine’s
2018 election for the U.S. House of Representatives. In Maine’s
Second Congressional District, four candidates qualified to appear on
the ballot: the incumbent Bruce Poliquin, Jared Golden, Tiffany Bond,
and William Hoar.47 The actual RCV ballot used in the election is
produced below.48

43. See, e.g., ME St T. 21-A section 723-A.
44. Id.
45. What is Maine ranked-choice voting and how does ranked-choice voting work?, (Sept. 22,
2020), https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/politics/elections/what-is-and-how-does-maineranked-choice-voting-work/97-e7964e06-a087-4b79-97cc-7f053c294248.
46. San Francisco City Charter, § 13.102(b).
47. BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Maine%27s_2nd_Congressional_District_election,_
2018, (last visited April 27, 2021).
48. Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 129.
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After the first round of voting, forty-six percent of voters ranked
Poliquin as their first choice while forty-five percent chose Golden.49
Under the standard plurality voting system, Poliquin would have won.
Nevertheless, because no candidate received over fifty percent, the
RCV election continued.50 Because it was statistically impossible for
Bond or Hoar to reach fifty percent, both were dubbed “non-continuing
candidates” and were eliminated.51 Consequently, the twenty-four
thousand voters who ranked either Bond or Hoar as their first choice
had those votes eliminated52 and then reallocated to either Poliquin or
Golden, depending on which candidate the voter ranked secondhighest.53 After the final tabulation, Golden prevailed by just over
three thousand votes.54 Poliquin, the two-term incumbent, lost despite
winning the plurality vote.
3. Pros and Cons of RCV

RCV is both praised and vilified. Proponents of RCV highlight that
the system elects candidates with broader, majority support.55 In
theory, by requiring majority support, a candidate is more
representative of the population as a whole, and polarized candidates
are discouraged from only “playing to their base.”56 Further,
proponents argue that RCV deters negative campaigning, grants voters
more choice, and saves time, money, and resources by not requiring a
separate runoff election.57 In contrast, RCV is criticized for its
complexity and confusion.58 Some argue that is difficult enough to
logically choose one candidate, let alone distinguish between two,
three, or four.59 And when voters are confused, they cast spoiled
ballots or detach from the political process entirely, thus lowering
49. The actual vote tallies in the first round of the election were as follows: Poliquin: 134,184
votes; Golden: 132,013 votes; Bond: 16,552 votes; and Hoar: 6,875 votes. Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 130.
50. Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 131.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Betty Keller, Pros and Cons of Instant Runoff (Ranked Choice) Voting, LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF VERMONT, https://my.lwv.org/vermont/article/pros-and-cons-instant-runoff-ranked-choicevoting, (last visited April 27, 2021).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Matthew Gagnon, Ranked-choice voting makes elections unnecessarily complex and
confusing,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS,
(Aug.
5,
2020),
https://bangordailynews.com
/2020/08/05/opinion/contributors/ranked-choice-voting-makes-elections-unnecessarily-complex-andconfusing-2.
59. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 10

718

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

voter participation.60 Opponents also contend that RCV elections
increase costs.61 Moreover, opponents argue that while RCV
theoretically encourages positive campaigning and produces
candidates with broad support, in practice, RCV elections enable
candidates with only marginal or little support to prevail.62
B. The Legal Standard for Evaluating Election Laws

Having now understood the facts of RCV, this Section details the
legal framework that courts often apply to assess the constitutionality
of election laws. Because of the sanctity of the right to vote and the
direct impact that elections have on the balance of political power,
changes to voting laws are fervently litigated.63 While numerous
different legal standards exist for challenging electoral practices,64 the
U.S. Supreme Court has crafted the Anderson-Burdick framework—a
popular test used to determine if an election law violates the Equal
Protection Clause.65 Under this framework, courts must first evaluate
the extent to which a law burdens the right to vote.66 Laws can impose
non-severe burdens, intermediate burdens, or severe burdens.67 If the
law imposes a severe burden on voting rights, strict scrutiny applies
and the law must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.68 If the law is not sufficiently tailored, it is unconstitutional.
But when the burden is found to be non-severe and imposes only
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions, courts apply a deferential

60. Mary Kenny, Ranked-choice voting linked to lower voter turnout, SAN FRANCISCO STATE
UNIVERSITY, (Oct. 23, 2015), https://news.sfsu.edu/news-story/ranked-choice-voting-linked-lowervoter-turnout.
61. In Maine, implementing RCV nearly doubled the state’s election costs. Expenses include voter
outreach and education initiatives, purchasing new voting machines to count RCV ballots, unique hard
drives, and transportation costs. See, e.g., Jack Dodson, Ranked choice voting costs questioned, THE
ELLSWORTH AMERICAN, (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.ellsworthamerican.com/maine-news/politicalnews/ranked-choice-voting-costs-questioned.
62. Hans von Spakovsky, Ranked Choice Voting is a Bad Choice, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
(Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/ranked-choice-voting-bad-choice.
63. See Hasen, Richard L., Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, WASHINGTON & LEE L. REV., Vol. 62 937, 939 (2005).
64. One other such doctrine is one person, one vote. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963) (“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing—one person, one vote.”).
65. The test is named after the two seminal cases of Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)
and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). The test is used for evaluating all First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to election laws, not just Equal Protection Clause violations.
66. Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 784 (6th Cir. 2020).
67. Id.
68. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
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rational basis standard.69 Generally, the government’s important
regulatory interests are sufficient to survive rational basis review.70
A more demanding Anderson-Burdick analysis is required when an
election law falls between the two extremes. When a law imposes
moderate burdens on voting rights, those burdens are closely weighed
against the precise governmental interests offered in justification.71
The government must proffer legitimate interests that are “sufficiently
weighty” to justify the burdens.72 Under this inquiry, the court must
determine the legitimacy and strength of each interest and even
evaluate alternative approaches to determine whether those
governmental interests make it necessary to burden the right to vote.73
If the governmental interests fail to outweigh the burdens on voting
rights, the law is struck down as unconstitutional.
RCV has only been analyzed under Anderson-Burdick twice: by one
federal court and one state court. At the federal level, in Dudum v.
Arntz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that
RCV imposed little if any burden on voting rights and struck the
balance in favor of the government’s interests.74 The other AndersonBurdick analysis was conducted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Minneapolis.75 The court tacitly found
that the governmental interests served by RCV outweighed the burden
that RCV imposed on voting rights.76 However, because the case was
a procedural, not substantive, challenge to RCV, the Minnesota Voters
Alliance court did not engage in a standard Anderson-Burdick analysis.
C. RCV Survives Legal Challenges

When challenged on its constitutional merits, RCV has been
uniformly upheld. The most thorough substantive challenge to date is
Baber v. Dunlap,77 a litigation battle arising out of the aforementioned
2018 election in Maine’s Second Congressional District. In Baber,

69. Mays, 951 F.3d at 784.
70. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
71. Mays, 951 F.3d at 784 .
72. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (quoting Norman, 502
U.S. at 288-89).
73. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
74. Dudum, 640 F.3d. at 1112.
75. 766 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 2009).
76. Id. at 689. Because Minneapolis had not yet enacted its RCV system, the voters only initiated
a facial challenge and sought a declaratory judgment. Thus, much of the Anderson-Burdick analysis was
rooted in mere hypotheticals, and due to the procedural posture of the case, the government benefitted
from an overly deferential standard of review. Id.
77. 376 F.Supp.3d 125 (D. Me. 2018).
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four Maine voters filed suit challenging the RCV election system as
unconstitutional.78 Among other arguments, the voters contended that
RCV elections violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.79 The voters argued that the ballot instructions were too
confusing and their votes were diluted by the numerous rounds of vote
counting.80 Under RCV, those who voted for either Bond or Hoar as
their first-choice candidate were able to express their vote more than
once.81 Meanwhile, the clear plurality of Mainers who voted for Bruce
Poliquin had their votes counted less and were left disenfranchised.82
The district court disagreed. In doing so, the court held that Maine
could constitutionally use RCV in electing candidates for federal
office.83 The court concluded that the voters failed to demonstrate how
their votes actually received less weight.84 During round one of the
election, votes for Poliquin counted with the same weight as every
other vote.85 Poliquin simply failed to achieve a majority after the first
round.86 The votes for Poliquin did not become irrelevant or diluted
during round two.87 In sum, because each ballot was counted no more
than once at each tabulation step, each vote received equal weight in
every round of balloting.88
The other notable substantive challenge to RCV is Dudum v.
Arntz.89 In Dudum, San Francisco voters argued that the city’s use of
“restricted” RCV violated the Equal Protection Clause. 90 As is
common, under San Francisco’s RCV system, voters were limited to
ranking only three candidates.91 The city argued that the limit was
necessary because the voting machines were not equipped to tabulate
unlimited rankings.92 As a result, allowing voters to rank more than
three candidates would have increased costs, posed logistical issues,
confused voters, and led to inaccurate vote calculations.93 The Dudum
78. Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 129.
79. Id. at 138. In addition to the Equal Protection violation, plaintiffs alleged RCV violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act. Id.
80. Id. at 129.
81. Id. at 130-31.
82. Id. at 129.
83. Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 146-47.
84. Id. at 140-41.
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at n 21.
89. 640 F.3d. 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).
90. Dudum, 640 F.3d. at 1101.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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voters also contended that RCV is not one election but rather a series
of elections where a small class of voters—who have their second or
third choice votes counted—are impermissibly allowed more than one
vote.94
The Dudum court also rejected these arguments. The court found
that RCV does not operate as multiple elections because “each ballot
is counted as no more than one vote at each tabulation step.”95 The
court argued that whether representing a voter’s first, second, or thirdchoice candidate, each vote is “afforded the same mathematical weight
in the election.”96 Unlike in Baber, the Dudum court did apply the
Anderson-Burdick framework. As to the burdens, the court concluded
that RCV imposes a “minimal—and perhaps nonexistent” burden on
voters’ equal protection rights.97 As to the governmental interests, the
restriction avoided increased costs, maintained an orderly election, and
limited voter confusion.98 Because the governmental interests easily
outweighed the “nonexistent” burden on voting rights, the court
concluded that RCV was constitutional.99
III. DISCUSSION

Although a few courts have upheld RCV against substantive Equal
Protection challenges, these decisions are misguided. The first error is
that some courts fail to analyze RCV under the Anderson-Burdick
framework, as in Baber. Even if a court avoids the first error, like the
Ninth Circuit in Dudum, they incorrectly operate from a faulty
premise. As courts have understood it, RCV operates as just one
election where voters are treated alike.100 From that core premise,
courts conclude that RCV imposes little to no burden on voting
rights.101 Although such a conclusion flows logically from that core
premise, the premise itself is deeply flawed. A faulty premise results
in faulty conclusions.
This Part challenges the notion that voters in RCV elections cast just
one vote, for one candidate, in one election. First, Section A argues
94. Id. at 1112.
95. Dudum, 640 F.3d. at 1112.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1113.
98. Id. at 1115-16.
99. Id. at 1117.
100. See, e.g. Minnesota Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 686 (“[RCV] eliminates the process of
separate primary and general elections in favor of a single election in which voters may rank all candidates
for a particular office in order of the voters' preference.” (emphasis added)).
101. See, e.g. Dudum, 640 F.3d. at 1112 (noting that RCV imposes “at most minimal—and perhaps
nonexistent—burden on voters' constitutional rights.”).
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that RCV operates as multiple elections and permits some voters a
greater ability to influence the outcome of an election than others.
Granting some voters a disproportionate ability to change the outcome
of an election is a serious issue, one that our Federal Constitution views
as dangerous.102 But infinitely more dangerous than a single court
mistaking how RCV operates is the judicial uniformity in committing
that error. Section B challenges that uniformity. By considering the
burdens, benefits, and alternatives to RCV, Section B holds RCV to
scrutiny under Anderson-Burdick. Ultimately, this Part argues that in
future legal challenges, courts should apply the Anderson-Burdick
framework and conclude that RCV violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
A. The Incorrect Premises and RCV’s True Burdens

The constitutionality of RCV turns on whether some voters are
afforded “an increased opportunity to affect the outcome of an
election” than other voters.103 Among similarly situated voters, the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit some votes to carry a greater
weight than others.104 At the heart of this inquiry is whether RCV’s
rounds of tabulation function as one election or multiple elections. This
Article submits that RCV is the latter. In total, this Article identifies
four primary burdens that RCV inflicts on voting rights. Each is
assessed in turn.
1. RCV Operates as Multiple Elections

RCV operates as more than one election and in doing so, affords
some voters a weightier and unequal opportunity to influence electoral
outcomes. Strong evidence that RCV systems produce more than one
election exists in the text of RCV statutes, interest groups that support
RCV, and state officials who have defended RCV in court. Statutes
that enact RCV direct election officials to engage in multiple “rounds”
of vote disbursement.105 FairVote, an organization dedicated to
implementing RCV, describes the process as a multitude of runoff
elections (yes, plural) where candidates are sequentially eliminated in
each (yes, separate) election.106 In defending RCV from legal
102. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“a citizen has a constitutionally protected
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”).
103. Dimino, Smith & Solimine, VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW, 1115 (3rd ed. 2021).
104. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
105. ME St T. 21-A section 723-A.
106. Details about
Ranked
Choice
Voting,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org
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challenges, courts and government officials have argued that RCV
simulates a series of runoff elections.107 For example, San Francisco’s
system is not called RCV but rather by its closely-related title, “Instant
Runoff Voting.”108 To achieve a true instant runoff, as proponents
argue it does, RCV systems must count votes as if there were indeed
multiple, separate runoff elections.
Moreover, election scholars confirm that RCV is more than one
election. According to leading political science professor and voting
systems expert, Dr. Jonathan D. Katz,109 an election is defined as a
given set of voters choosing amongst a given set of candidates.110 Each
time the voters and candidates change, there is a distinct and separate
election.111 In practice, RCV does precisely that. If no candidate
receives a majority of votes, the lowest candidates are removed from
contention and eliminated from the pool of viable candidates. But not
only do the candidates change in subsequent rounds of an RCV
election, so do the voters. For example, in one San Francisco RCV
election, by the final round of tabulation, twenty-seven percent of
voters had their ranked ballots exhausted and were no longer actively
participating with the other seventy-three percent of voters.112 Because
both candidates and voters change in every subsequent round, RCV is
properly considered not one, but multiple elections.
Some may argue that RCV’s practical consequence of producing
multiple elections is inconsequential.113 However, this commonlydeployed argument ignores the more serious threat lurking in the
background. Although passed off as “subsequent rounds” of a single
election, properly understood, RCV’s multiple elections treat some
voters more favorably than others. Voters who rank a non-continuing
candidate first, and thus have their second or third choice considered,
get to morph their ballots into outcome determinative votes. In
contrast, voters who rank a continuing candidate are stuck with a single
choice and that single vote. Moreover, while some voters have their
/rcv#how_rcv_works, (last visited April 27, 2021) (emphasis added).
107. In fact, San Francisco offered this reason as justification for its RCV system. Dudum, 640 F.3d
at 1107.
108. San Francisco City Charter, § 13.102.
109. See An Audit of Political Behavior Research, SAGE OPEN, 2018:1–14 (2018); Elbridge
Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution, NEW YORK:
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (2002).
110. Dudum Appellant’s Brief, No. 10-17198 at 17.
111. Id. at 33.
112. Official Ranked-Choice Results Report, CONSOLIDATED MUNICIPAL ELECTION MAYOR, (Nov.
8, 2011), https://sfelections.org/results/20111108/data/mayor.html. In San Francisco’s 2011 mayoral
election, 197,242 voters participated in the election. By the final round of tabulation, 52,524 votes, or
twenty-seven percent, had been exhausted. Id.
113. See, e.g., Minnesota Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 690-91.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 10

724

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

votes counted again and again, others have their ballots eliminated in
RCV’s subsequent rounds. For an example, consider the election data
from a San Francisco RCV election. It is illogical to suggest that the
twenty-seven percent of voters who had their ballots exhausted by the
last round were afforded an “equal chance” to impact the outcome of
the election—they did not even have a vote to exercise in the later
elections.114 Thus, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Dudum,
votes are not afforded the “same mathematical weight” in RCV
elections.115 Rather, RCV operates as multiple, unequal elections
where some votes are elevated to outcome-determinative status, some
are locked in place, while others are exhausted entirely.
2. RCV Forces Voters to Participate in Hypothetical Elections

The legislative purpose and historical justifications for adopting
RCV uncover another burden imposed on voting rights. RCV elections
are often construed as efficient replacements of a two-election
system.116 In a two-election system, the general election is held in
November, and if one candidate does not receive a majority of the
votes, a runoff election is held between the top two candidates.117
Before this runoff election, voters are able to reassess policy platforms,
hear further debate, and ultimately cast a single vote for one of the two
candidates. While RCV mimics this system, it severely distorts it. In
practice, RCV operates as separate runoff elections conducted in
secrecy behind closed doors. In these closed-door runoffs, no
consideration is given to the fact that the pool of candidates and voters
are everchanging. Thus, RCV insists that a voter do what common
sense says is impossible: predict the future and cast a vote in an
uncertain, hypothetical election.
Election experts and political scientists have long observed voting
behavior as a product of numerous factors.118 While a voter’s party
affiliation is most salient, the core bloc of undecided voters heavily
consider a candidate’s approachability, family, religious affiliation, or

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1112.
See, e.g., Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 141.
Wendy Underhill, Primary Runoff Elections, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, (Aug. 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-runoffelections.aspx. Two-election systems are extremely popular in other countries such as France, Brazil, and
Ukraine. Id. In the United States, Georgia is the only state that uses a two-election system for general
elections. Id. Many other states use the system for federal primaries and state gubernatorial elections. Id.
118. How
Voters
Decide,
LUMEN,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundlesspoliticalscience/chapter/how-voters-decide, (last visited April 27, 2021).
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upbringing.119 Because there are numerous candidates in an election,
however, voters do not consider these factors in a vacuum but rather
in relation to other candidates.120 Logically, in order to weigh a
candidate’s platform, qualifications, and characteristics relative to
other candidates, a voter must know the full array of candidates. When
the candidates change, so do voter decisions.
In practice, RCV precludes voters from deciding which candidates
are worthy of their votes—a concept central to elections.121 To
illustrate this point, consider if RCV had been used in the 2016
presidential election and the all-too common predicament of
hypothetical Voter A. As to substantive political issues, Voter A was
strongly in favor of Gary Johnson’s political platform, namely on
maintaining a small national government and drug reform policy.
While Voter A also agreed with the policies of Donald Trump, she
found him to be too irreverent and unpresidential.122 Voter A disagreed
with most of Hillary Clinton’s political positions, but her extensive
career in government made her far more poised and professional than
Trump. Voter A also found Clinton more approachable and
trustworthy than Trump. In light of these considerations, Voter A
ranked her ballot as follows: (1) Johnson (Libertarian); (2) Clinton
(Democrat); (3) Trump (Republican). As was the reality in numerous
2016 battleground states, suppose that neither Clinton nor Trump
reached the fifty-percent threshold and thus, as the lowest vote-getter,
Johnson was eliminated in the first round of RCV.
At this point, the RCV process seems facially harmless. Remember,
however, that Voter A’s selections were based both on the relative
weight of the candidates’ substantive political positions as well as
temperament, approachability, and character traits. As studies of voter
behavior suggests, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that, in a
separate election between only Clinton and Trump, Voter A’s
preference for Trump’s substantive policy positions would now
outweigh her favor of Clinton’s personality.123 But the RCV ballot
entirely fails to consider that reality. In practice, RCV forces voters to
gaze into the crystal ball and forecast their preferences should the pool
of candidates change, and in real time, cast votes based on
hypothetical, future elections. This is the functional equivalent of

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Hannah Hartig, Poll: Clinton Maintains Big Lead as Voters Doubt Trump’s Temperament,
CBS NEWS, (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/data-points/poll-clinton-maintains-biglead-voters-doubt-trump-s-temperament-n631351.
123. Id.
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requiring voters to select a party nominee in a spring primary election,
while also casting their vote for the general election without knowing
who the other candidates will be or hearing any further debate from
those candidates. This feature of RCV not only burdens voting rights
and leads to wasted ballots, it is fundamentally illogical.
3. RCV Defies Electoral Common Sense

RCV elections also violate a commonsense notion of electoral
behavior known as monotonicity.124 The principle is straightforward:
ranking a candidate first should never cause that candidate to lose, and
ranking a candidate lower than first should never cause that candidate
to win.125 RCV, however, suffers from the problem of nonmonotonicity—where a candidate can lose after receiving an increase
in support.126 Likewise, a disfavored candidate can win by
experiencing a decrease in support.127 Thus, RCV’s ranking structure
can reward candidates who receive no increase in support during
subsequent rounds and disadvantage candidates who garner more voter
support. In forty percent of RCV elections where the plurality winner
ultimately lost, non-monotonicity was the culprit.128 Thus, RCV’s nonmonotonicity tempts voters to engage in electoral chicanery by ranking
their favorite candidate second or third to avoid harming her in
subsequent rounds of vote tabulation. Yet again, RCV produces a
result devoid of logic.
4. RCV Generates Voter Confusion

While exercising the right to vote should be a straightforward
practice, RCV is unduly complex. RCV is not only confusing to
understand initially but that confusion follows voters into the ballot
box.129 In fact, RCV ballots increase the rate of voter error through a
phenomenon called overvoting.130 An overvote occurs if a voter selects
more than one candidate in a single round of an RCV election or votes
124. Monotonicity, THE CENTER FOR ELECTION SCIENCE, https://electionscience
.org/library/monotonicity, (last visited April 27, 2021).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Anthony Brooks, A Greater Choice or Confusing: Arguments For and Against Ranked Choice
Voting, WBUR NEWS, (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/10/14/wbur-debate-question-2ranked-choice-voting. ("It's confusing to me, and I'm a pretty sophisticated voter with a Harvard Law
degree," Braceras said.)
130. BALLOTPEDIA supra note 6.
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for the same candidate more than once.131 Although this seems like a
quick educational fix, many voters cast an overvote in earnest.132 For
example, some voters believe that to express support for their favorite
candidate in an RCV election, they need to fill in the box next to that
candidate’s name for each round.133 When overvotes occur, the voter’s
entire ballot is “exhausted” and rendered null and void for the entire
election.134 In other words, a simple voter mistake leads to a
disenfranchised voice.
To be certain, the argument that RCV elections increase vote
exhaustion is not a hypothesis; it actually happens. For example,
during the initial round of an RCV election in San Francisco, 820
ballots were exhausted due to an overvote.135 Additionally, in Maine’s
Second Congressional District election, 6,453 votes were exhausted in
the first round alone.136 By the final round of tabulation, over 15,000
votes had been thrown out.137 Of these, 533 voters had overvoted and
another 335 votes were not counted for failure to select a continuing
candidate.138 In closely-contested elections decided by a few thousand
votes, these numbers are significant.
The electoral confusion and disenfranchisement created by RCV
also impacts voters disproportionately along lines of race, age, and
gender. Following San Francisco’s implementation of RCV, election
scholars conducted studies to better understand RCV’s impact on
overvoting and general voter confusion.139 The results are cause for
concern. After RCV was implemented, the rate of exhausted ballots
and overvoting increased in minority precincts primarily comprised of
African American, Latino, and foreign-born voters.140 Precincts with
higher elderly and low-income populations saw similar increases.141
Further, studies find that women are more likely than men to have
ballots exhausted because of RCV errors.142
Taken together, RCV imposes four primary burdens on voting rights
131. Overvote, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Overvote, (last visited April 27, 2021).
132. Gagnon, supra note 58.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., ME St T. 21-A section 723-A.
135. Official Ranked-Choice Results Report, CONSOLIDATED MUNICIPAL ELECTION MAYOR, (Nov.
8, 2011), https://sfelections.org/results/20111108/data/mayor.html.
136. Tabulations for Elections held in 2018, DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/results/results18.html#Nov6, (last visited April 27, 2021).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Neely, F., & McDaniel, J., Overvoting and the Equality of Voice under Instant-Runoff Voting
in San Francisco, CALIFORNIA JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND POLICY (2015).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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and voter efficacy. First, RCV functions as numerous, closed-door
runoff elections, where some voters are afforded a greater weight and
ability to influence the outcome of an election. Second, RCV deprives
voters of an educated and meaningful vote in those subsequent
elections. Third, RCV defies the core tenets and common sense nature
of elections. Fourth, RCV is confusing, both in theory and in practice,
such that an increased number of voters commit error resulting in
disenfranchisement. The standard counterargument is that votes are
simply counted the same at each round of the RCV election,143 but
cloaked behind that simplistic justification lies the reality that, while
numerically counted the same, these votes are fraught with voter
confusion, uncertainty, and inequity.
B. Reanalyzing the Constitutionality of RCV

Contrary to what courts have concluded, Section A explained how
RCV is far from burden free.144 Rather, RCV imposes considerable
burdens on voting rights.145 Thus, because its burdens have been
ignored or wholly miscategorized by courts, RCV has eluded an
appropriate Equal Protection analysis. For the benefit of future
litigants and courts, this Section contends that RCV should be analyzed
using the Anderson-Burdick framework, under which, courts should
conclude that RCV is unconstitutional.
1. The Burdens and Governmental Interests

As outlined above, RCV elections impose four primary burdens on
voting rights.146 Those burdens, however, are better understood in light
of the governmental interests put forth as justification for instituting
RCV. In defending their use of RCV, state governments have proffered
numerous interests.147 At its core, the government contends that RCV
realizes the benefits of a two-election system without the downsides of
a two-election system. First, by requiring majority support, RCV
ensures that the victorious candidate better represents the entire

143. Minnesota Voters Alliance, 766 N.W.2d at 690.
144. Dudum, 640 F.3d. at 1112.
145. This Comment concedes that RCV does not impose severe burdens on voting rights and thus,
is not subject to strict scrutiny. But RCV is not burden-free, as courts have concluded. Thus, the highly
deferential rational basis standard is also inappropriate. Thus, RCV is more appropriately analyzed under
the standard for election laws that impose intermediate burdens on voting rights. See, e.g., Mays, 951 F.3d
at 784.
146. Supra, Part II, Section A.
147. See, e.g., Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1114-1116.
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electorate.148 Second, RCV incentivizes candidates to run more
civilized campaigns.149 By rewarding candidates who achieve majority
support, RCV enriches candidate debate beyond hyper-partisan
concerns. Third, by not requiring a separate runoff election, RCV saves
time, money, and resources.150 Fourth, RCV results in higher voter
participation and permits more voters to express their beliefs.151
According to the government, these interests not only justify but
greatly outweigh the fact that RCV operates as multiple closed-door
runoff elections, confuses some voters, and suffers from irregularities.
2. Striking the Balance

The most meaningful part of the Anderson-Burdick analysis occurs
when balancing a law’s burden on voting rights against the
government’s interest in achieving the law’s objectives. To survive a
constitutional challenge, the government’s precise interests must be
“sufficiently weighty” to overcome the burdens imposed on voting
rights.152 It is insufficient that the government simply assert these
interests; the government must detail why those interests are furthered
by the specific election law.153 In doing so, courts consider both the
legitimacy and strength of each interest.154 Because the Baber and
Dudum courts began with the incorrect notion that RCV poses little, if
any, burden on voting rights, they did not properly conduct this
analysis.155 In fact, no court has conducted this analysis on the
substantive merits of an RCV challenge.
First, courts should quickly dismiss the government’s argument that
RCV improves political civility and produces elected officials who
better represent the electorate. Courts should not be diverted in their
analyses by the facial appeal of these interests. In a time of heightened
political divisiveness in the U.S., these are admittedly attractive
objectives. But they are nothing more than speculative and devoid of
factual support. Notably, there is little to no evidence that RCV
improves civility in politics or encourages candidates to campaign to
a broader base of voters.156 What is more, RCV does not always result
148. Keller, supra note 55.
149. Id.
150. Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1115-16.
151. Id.
152. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.
153. Id. at 191-92.
154. Id. at 191.
155. See, e.g. Dudum, 640 F.3d. at 1112.
156. Daniel DiSalvo, The Promise and Peril of Ranked-Choice Voting, CITY JOURNAL, (Apr. 12,
2021), https://www.city-journal.org/promise-and-peril-of-ranked-choice-voting. Some studies show RCV
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in the election of a candidate who received majority support. In fact,
in the past, RCV elections have failed to elect a candidate with
majority support.157 Because the government has no factual basis to
demonstrate how RCV furthers these two interests, they fail to rise
above mere conjecture and pale in comparison to the burdens RCV
imposes on voting rights.
Even assuming there is data to support the notion that politics is
more civil and candidates campaign more broadly under RCV systems,
the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected them outright.158 Notably, these
two “interests” are illegitimate because they are nothing more than
deliberate admissions that the government would prefer different
representatives or political platforms than those currently selected by
voters.159 Simply put, the government is not permitted to justify an
election law through its mere desire to produce candidates and policy
platforms that are “more acceptable” or viewed as more palatable to a
majority of the electorate.160 When the government does so, it runs
afoul of the freedom of political association—a right protected by the
First Amendment.161 Selecting candidates and policy platforms
acceptable to voters is precisely the goal of the democratic process, not
an objective for the government to control through an electoral system.
Second, no one doubts that the government has a legitimate interest
in saving time, money, and resources.162 The government also has an
interest in alleviating the administrative burdens imposed by
conducting multiple elections.163 And at its core, RCV is purposed to
accomplish the benefits of a two-round election without actually
conducting the second runoff election. It is argued that a one-time
RCV ballot avoids the hassle of requiring voters to return to the polls,
saves money in printing ballots, and preserves electoral resources.
These interests, however, are insufficient when balanced directly
against the burdens imposed by RCV. Concrete numbers illuminate
the inadequacy of this governmental interest. For example, in Dudum,
the government argued that by avoiding a second runoff between the
top two candidates, approximately $1.5 million in various costs were
saved.164 While that is a considerable amount of money when viewed
decreases political civility. Id.
157. The 2010 Burlington, Vermont mayoral election is one example. Baruth, supra note 39.
158. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000). Jones did not involve RCV.
Rather, it involved a legal challenge to California’s open-primary process.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999).
163. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
164. Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1116.
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in isolation, the weight of that number shrinks dramatically when one
considers the heart of the argument. In the mayoral election during the
year that Dudum was litigated, 197,242 San Francisco voters took to
the polls.165 Dividing the total cost of a second run-off election with
the voter turnout in San Francisco equates to just ten dollars per voter.
Thus, at its core, the government is really arguing that saving ten
dollars per voter justifies an electoral system that engenders confusion
and results in disenfranchisement. Saving ten dollars per voter justifies
forcing voters to predict the outcome of hypothetical elections. Saving
ten dollars per voter justifies a system that permits some voters an
ability to cast outcome determinative votes, while others are
eliminated entirely.
One should be immediately skeptical that saving ten dollars per
voter is sufficiently weighty to justify the burdens imposed by RCV.
Although it is difficult to envision the magic dollar amount that could
justify an electoral system that prioritizes some votes over others,
defies electoral common sense, and confuses voters into
disenfranchisement, ten dollars per voter is grossly inadequate.
Moreover, although the government argues that RCV saves money, it
ignores a gaping hole in that argument—the considerable financial
costs of RCV itself. To implement and maintain RCV, the government
must conduct detailed voter education campaigns, print new RCV
ballots, and purchase expensive ballot machines.166 In Maine,
implementing RCV increased the state’s electoral budget two-fold.167
In the same vein, RCV does not alleviate administrative burdens but
rather increases the toll on election personnel and resources. In fact, if
the government had a sincere interest in preserving money and
resources, it should avoid implementing RCV entirely.
Only one governmental interest remains. And it is a legitimate one:
the state’s interest in achieving higher voter participation so that more
voters impact the outcome of an election.168 The government would be
correct in noting that on the whole, more voters participate in general
elections than in a separate runoff election.169 Thus, it is argued that
RCV permits more voters to have an active say in the outcome of an
election all while incorporating the benefits of a two-election system.
The persuasiveness of this state interest, however, diminishes when
balanced against the burdens imposed by RCV. In fact, the burdens
165. Official Ranked-Choice Results Report, supra note 135.
166. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 61.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145.
169. Underhill, supra note 117. Research shows that separate runoff elections attract 20 to 30
percent fewer voters. Id.
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that RCV imposes can themselves be said to decrease voter
participation and undermine voter efficacy. Overvoting and higher
rates of ballot exhaustion in RCV elections do not just decrease voter
participation, they eliminate participation entirely. The burden
imposed by RCV’s non-monotonicity is relevant too. It not only
confuses voters but may produce obscure results—ranking one’s
favorite candidate higher may actually harm that candidate’s chances
of success. Voters must question whether ranking their preferred
candidate first might ultimately help elect a disfavored candidate. One
voter’s guess is as uncertain as any other’s. So, although more voters
might participate in an RCV election as compared to a second runoff
election, there is serious doubt as to the efficacy of those votes. Thus,
the government rests on unstable logical grounds when it attempts to
justify a notoriously confusing system, which results in higher voter
disenfranchisement, as somehow increasing voter participation.
The state’s interest in higher voter participation is further
undermined by RCV’s closed-door runoff and hypothetical election
burdens. RCV prevents those who voted for continuing candidates
from re-considering or re-casting a separate, unique vote in subsequent
rounds. To the contrary, those who voted for non-continuing
candidates can have their second or third-choice vote freely
transferred. Those transferred votes then become outcome
determinative. Thus, if the government argues that RCV permits more
voters to impact the outcome of an election than in a separate runoff,
the correct number of voters for comparison purposes is those who
voted for non-continuing candidates. In actuality, it is only those voters
who have a unique ability to participate in subsequent rounds of RCV
elections.
Therefore, RCV’s use of subsequent, closed-door runoff elections
actually reduces, rather than increases, voter participation. By
definition, a small number of voters rank non-continuing candidates
first—usually between six and ten percent of the electorate.170 Thus,
the government’s voter participation argument is unavailing, unless it
can demonstrate that less than ten percent of general election voters
would return to the polls in a separate runoff election. But election data
reveals that the government cannot do so.171 In fact, some states have
higher voter turnout in runoff elections than in general elections.172
Consequently, the burdens imposed by RCV not only outweigh this
170. As one example, in the first round of Maine’s Second Congressional District election just over
eight percent of the electorate cast votes for non-continuing candidates. Tabulations for Elections held in
2018, supra note 136.
171. Underhill, supra note 117.
172. Id.
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justification but expose precisely why the government’s interest in
increased voter participation is hollow.
Even assuming that a court would find the government’s interests
equal to the burdens imposed by RCV, alternative approaches to
effectuate those interests tilt the balance further against RCV. For
election laws that impose moderate burdens, such as RCV, considering
alternative methods highlights whether the burdens are truly necessary
to achieve the governmental interests.173 If the governmental interest
can be accomplished by alternative means, thus making it unnecessary
to burden voting rights, the balance shifts in favor of striking down the
law.174 As to the interest in saving money and resources, the
government can simply decrease spending or raise funds through
familiar revenue-generating tactics. And if these alternatives prove
insufficient, state and local governments could rely on increased
election spending from the federal government. In fact, Congress
proposed this solution in the For the People Act.175 As to the interest
of increasing voter participation, the government could promote “get
out the vote” campaigns or support voter awareness initiatives.
More importantly, governments could simply do what they have
always done—operate a single plurality election. Conducting a
plurality election avoids every unique burden that RCV imposes on
voting rights. Voters are less likely to mistakenly cast overvotes. If
voters want to elect their favorite candidate, they know to simply fill
in the box next to that candidate’s name. Voters are not forced to
hypothesize how they would vote in a future election among an
unknown field of candidates. In a plurality election, voters are not
afforded a second or third opportunity to alter the outcome of an
election. Rather, each voter gets one vote in one election. In sum, the
government could better achieve all of its legitimate interests without
introducing the unique burdens that RCV inflicts upon voting rights.
The governmental interests in support of RCV cannot prevail when
balanced against its burdens. The state interests are either illegitimate,
supported by mere conjecture, or entirely hollow. Thus, when the
burdens are properly understood, RCV fails to survive the AndersonBurdick framework. Some may object that it is judicial overreach for
courts to invalidate duly enacted electoral systems. But when the rights
of citizens are violated, especially the right to vote, “the Constitution
173. See, e.g., Mays, 951 F.3d at 784.
174. Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1115, n. 27.
175. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 298(e) (“To the greatest extent practicable,
an eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting system under this section shall ensure that the
replacement system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice voting under which each voter
shall rank the candidates for the office in the order of the voter’s preference.”).
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requires redress by the courts,” notwithstanding the general value of
democratic decision making.176 Voters, state legislatures, and
Congress can—and should—debate whether to reject or adopt RCV.
But if adopted and implemented, courts unquestionably play a role in
assessing whether an electoral system comports with the Constitution.
This Part has detailed how RCV does not and should be struck down.
IV. CONCLUSION

The bedrock electoral principle undergirding the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee is that any one citizen has a
constitutionally protected right to participate in an election on an equal
basis with others.177 RCV affronts that principle. While courts have
uniformly found RCV free of any voting burdens or inequities, this
Comment challenges that notion. RCV is not just one election, it is
multiple. RCV does not give equal opportunity to every voter but
rather enhances the efficacy of some votes to the detriment of others.
RCV is not easy to understand and infects the democratic process with
unique complexities. And when it does burden voting rights, RCV
does so unequally by inflicting harsher burdens on voters of certain
demographics. When RCV is challenged in the future, courts should
utilize Anderson-Burdick’s flexible standard to properly account for
each of these burdens and conclude that they are not outweighed by
any governmental interests.
Because RCV is spreading rapidly throughout the United States, it
is paramount to understand the true burdens the system inflicts on
voting rights now, not later. Consider the serious implications if RCV
elections spread nationwide for use in all federal elections, including
for President of the United States. With Maine’s Second Congressional
District as a warning, RCV can and will alter the outcome of
elections—not because of a change in substance but simply because
the method for electing officials changed. Some of those outcomes will
favor Democrats, and some will favor Republicans. Others might fall
in favor of third-party candidates. But one’s partisan preference must
not outweigh the importance of preserving the constitutional principle
that voters should cast votes of equal weight. If RCV continues to
expand, that principle will continue to erode. Legislatures, courts, and
the voting public alike must understand the negative effects that RCV
tolls on voting rights. A failure to make this realization soon might be
too little, too late.
176. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015) (quoting Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623,
1637 (2014)).
177. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
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